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ABSTRACT. 
This paper seeks to prove that the establishment of any form of publicly accessible 
sex offender registry in New Zealand is not a demonstrably justified limitation on an 
offenders' right to privacy, in a free and democratic society. It is acknowledged that the 
right to privacy is not included in the Bill of Rights Act. However, the author suggests the 
framework of section 5 can still be used to determine whether a reasonable restriction has 
been placed upon a common law right. This paper outlines legislation and case law 
regarding sex offender registries in other jurisdictions, and uses it as a springboard for 
discussion regarding the constitutionality of the Sex Offender Registry Bill 2003. In 
completing a section 5 analysis of the Bill's disclosure clause, the author states that 
offenders do have a right to privacy and can expect their residential address to remain 
private in these circw11stances. The only reasonable lin1itation that can be placed upon this 
right is a register that is solely accessible by Police for investigatory purposes. The Sex 
Offender Registry Bill 2003 was therefore unconstitutional and should never have reached 
the Select Committee stage. Parliament hastily responded to public concern regarding 
sexual crin1es, without proper consideration for the Bill's legal foundations. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper ( excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, 
bibliography and appendices) comprises approximately 16,091 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
For a number of years commentators have debated whether the 
community notification of sex offenders ' residential addresses is 
justifiable. Clearly, when a man is convicted of the rape and murder of 
a child and continues to have violent sexual fantasies, arguments that 
the public have a right to know of his whereabouts hold some weight. 
But what about other offenders who simply make a one off mistake, are 
successfully rehabilitated and since their sentence, have lived as 
productive members of the community? Arguments regarding the 
benefits of sex offender registries in this case are less persuasive. 
Unfortunately, we are unable to reliably predict which offenders are 
likely to re-offend and which will go on to lead rewarding and 
offending free lives. It thus becomes a question of whether the public 
has a right to know the personal details of all sexual offenders in order 
to ' protect' themselves and their children, or whether they have no 
right at all. This essay seeks to consider whether the establishment of a 
sex offender registry in New Zealand is a demonstrably justifiable 
limitation on offenders' right to privacy or whether it goes beyond 
what is reasonable in a free and democratic society. While it is 
acknowledged that the right to privacy is not included in the Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 (BORA) ,1 in the absence of other direction , the 
framework of inquiry generated by section 5 of BORA provides an 
adequate foundation for discussions into the limitation of common law 
rights. 
Community notification of sex offenders' whereabouts traditionally 
requires a convicted offender to register with a central authority upon 
release from prison. Information is then compiled into a database and 
periodically updated with the names and addresses of every known sex 
offender. Such databases are typically publicly accessible at any time, by 
anyone in the community. Those in favour of community notification argue 
that "sex offenders are a serious threat to our nation" and it is a parents' 
right to have access to information that ultimately affects the safety of their 
children. 2 Those opposed to such a system suggest that publicly naming 
these offenders is not conducive to their rehabilitation and carries their 
punishment beyond the prison walls, effectively labeling them as 
community 'outsiders' for the rest of their lives. Whether such a register is 
justifiable is something that not only society and legal commentators 
disagree upon. The courts in both America and the United Kingdom have 
1 Bill of Rights Act 1990. Section 21 incorporates an element of privacy within the concept 
of the right to free from unreasonable search and seizure. Similarly, section 14 includes an 
element of privacy in the right to not disclose certain things. 
2 Ryan Hawkins " Human Zoning: The Constitutionality of Sex Offender Residency 
Restrictions as Applied to Post-Conviction Offenders" (2007) 5(2) Pierce Law Review 331 , 
331. 
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struggled to dete1mine the constitutionality of legislation that allows such 
notification. It is with this in mind that this paper considers the 
constitutionality of the New Zealand Sex Offender Registry Bill 2003 (the 
Bill). 
While the Bill was ultimately rejected by the Justice and Electoral 
Committee on the basis that it would not achieve its objectives, 3 it seems 
that an even greater issue was overlooked; the Bill's constitutionality. The 
Bill was praised in the House for its good intentions and hailed as a big step 
towards addressing the 'epidemic proportions' of sexual offending in New 
Zealand.4 But minimal discussion was had as to the legality of the Bill's 
proposals. From its conception, through to its drafting, readings within the 
House and consideration in Select Co1mnittee, little debate was directed 
towards the Bill's constitutional footing. While the Human Rights 
Commission and the New Zealand Law Society raised serious concerns as 
to the Bill's consistency with various rights, little other acknowledgment of 
the legal consequences of the Bill was made. 5 In fact, in a short 
memorandum of advice given by the Attorney General it was suggested that 
the Bill was actually consistent with BORA.6 It is on this basis that this 
paper suggests the Bill should never have reached the select committee 
stage within the legislative process. It was never going to be constitutionally 
viable in concept, or in drafting. 
The American Senate was able to push through legislation to create 
sex offender registries due to the strength of their first amendment right to 
freedom of expression. Nevertheless, it should have been clear that New 
Zealand was incapable of a similar action, given the weight of our right to 
privacy and the position of the right to freedom of expression within our 
3 
Justice and Electoral Committee Sex Offender Regist,y Bill: Report (Wellington, 1998) 1. 
4 (30 July 2003) 610 NZPD 7481. 
5 
See Human Rights Commission Sex Offender Registry Bill 2003 (Submission to Justice 
and Electoral Committee, Wellington 2003); New Zealand Law Society Sex Offender 
Regist,y Bill 2003 (Submission to Justice and Electoral Committee, Wellington 2003). 
6 
Attorney General Legal Advice on Sex Offender Regist,y Bill: Consistency with the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Submission to Justice and Electoral Committee, 
Wellington 2003) 1. 
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constitutional framework. It would seem that much like the American 
government, members of the New Zealand legislature got caught up in the 
public's fear of sexual offending. In their haste to be seen to be addressing 
the problem, a proposal was created based on unconstitutional policies. 7 
This paper in no way seeks to suggest that the affects of sexual offending 
are not severe and should be prevented where at all possible. However, this 
"fear and frustration must not drive communities to accept, as solutions, 
measures that are questionable in terms of effectiveness, justness and 
humaneness". 8 
Part two of this paper will outline the legislation that created sex 
offender registries in America and the United Kingdom. Both registries are 
fundamentally different and sit within their own legal, political and social 
contexts. However, they provide a platform for legal comparison with the 
New Zealand Bill, which was created with international experience in 
mind. 9 Parts three and four of this paper will then go on to highlight the 
constitutional struggle that has occurred in America and the legal hurdles 
that the New Zealand legislation faced. Finally, part five of this paper seeks 
to prove that the Bill, in its cmTent form, could never have been 
demonstrably justified under a section 5 analysis of BORA. In illustrating 
this proposition discussion will be had as to the extent of an offenders right 
to privacy, the weight of the right to freedom of expression in New Zealand, 
and the limitations that can be reasonably be placed on these conflicting 
rights. Within the discussion as to reasonable limitations, the paper will 
consider the purpose and significance of the rights involved, the objectives 
of the Bill, the public interest in limiting offenders' privacy rights and the 
proportionality of such limitations. 
7 Ryan Hawkins, above n 2, 331. 
8 John Howard Society of Alberta Offender Regist,y (200 I) 
www.johnhoward.ab.ca/PUB/offender.hb11 (accessed 18 September 2007) 1. 
9 Minisb·y of Justice Sex Offender Regist,y Bill 2003: Departmental Briefing (Wellington, 
2004) 5. 
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It is acknowledged that there are numerous other issues regarding 
the legality and practicality of the Bill; however the focus of this paper 
remains solely on the effect of the disclosure provisions in clause 13. 
II JURSIDITIONALAPPROACHES 
A American Position 
The American legislation establishing sex offender registries 1s 
considered a model for other jurisdictions that wish to implement similar 
systems. While all 50 states now have active sex offender registries, the 
operation of these registers vary in terms of the registration procedures used, 
information sharing processes, verification of details, maintenance of the 
system and community notification requirements. ' 0 The Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 requires all states to implement a 
system in which sexually violent offenders and those who commit sexual 
and kidnapping crimes against children, register their place of address upon 
release from prison. 11 This information is confidential and is only released 
to law enforcement agencies for public protection purposes and to 
government agencies in order to conduct background checks. 12 
Public notification of register details was not made mandatory until 
after the rape and murder of seven year old Megan Kanka by a neighbour 
who was twice convicted of sexual assault. 13 The Committee on the 
Judiciary suggests that as a result of public demand and the media attention 
surrounding Megan's death, the government was forced to introduce an 
amendment to the 1994 legislation named "Megan 's Law". 14 Commentators 
have referred to this notorious amendment as "an unusually ferocious piece 
of legislation born of parental emotion". 15 The amendment allowed not only 
for the publication of names, descriptions, photographs and addresses of 
10 
Home Office Police Research Group Keeping Track?: Observations on Sex Offender 
Registers in the US (Crime Detection and Prevention Series Paper 83, 1997) 7. 
11 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 42 USC. 
12 Ibid , s 17010l(d). 
13 
Office of the Attorney General Megan 's Law (Prepared for the Department of Justice, 
America, 2006) I. 
14 
( I 04'
h 
Congress 2d Session) I 04-555 Committee on the Judiciary 2. 
15 
(4 February 1997) The Sydney Morning Herald Sydney. 
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offenders, 16 but for law enforcement agencies to proactively communicate 
this information to all at risk groups in the community when "necessary". 17 
The extent and nature of this disclosure is determined by the risk 
classification given to the offender. 18 
Under Megan's law, registers are no longer deemed confidential and 
the public is free to access the information "for any purpose permitted under 
the laws of that State". 19 Thus, each state is entitled to determine whether 
the information contained in the register is entirely publicly accessible or if 
certain elements remain private.20 Such an amendment was based on 
submissions by the Attorney General and the Department of Justice which 
indicated that the 1994 Act could not achieve its purpose of protection 
without public access to the register: 21 
The requirement that registration information generally be created as 
private data is not necessary or helpful in realising the objectives of the 
Jacob Wetterling Act, and it imposes a limitation on the states that did 
not exist prior to the enactment of the Jacob Wetterling Act. We see no 
reason why States should not generally be free to make their own 
decisions concerning the extent to which registration data should or 
should not be treated as private data, as they have been in the past. We 
accordingly recommend deletion of the provision that in formation 
collected under State registration systems is generally to be treated as 
private data. 
It should also be noted that in addition to the above legislation, the 
1996 Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act 
establishes a National Sex Offender Registry at the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI). 22 The Act requires all information contained in the 
national register to be forwarded to the FBI and maintained within a 
database that is used to locate offenders who violate the Act.23 
16 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 42 USC s 17010l(d). 
17 Ibid, s 2 of amendment H.R. 2137. 
18 "Keeping Track?: Observations on Sex Offender Registers in the U.s' ', above n 10, 27. 
19 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 42 USC s 2 of amendment 
H.R. 2137. 
20 Ibid. 
21 United States Department of Justice Megan 's Law (Submission to Committee on the 
Judiciary, America, 1996) 6. 
22 "Keeping Track?: Observations on Sex Offender Registers in the U.s'', above n 10, 7. 
21 Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and ldenti fication Act 1996 42 USC s 14072. 
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B United Kingdom Position 
The Sex Offenders Act 1997 requires certain categories of sexual 
offenders to notify the police of their name, date of birth and residential 
address upon release from prison.24 These categories are determined by the 
type of offence committed, the victim and offenders ' age, and the length of 
the sentence imposed.25 It is also important to note that an offender who 
commits murder, manslaughter, kidnapping or abduction, with a sexual 
element, is not required to register. 26 Such a condition has led to 
considerable criticism of the system for falsely suggesting that the most 
active offenders are captured within the register.27 
The 1997 Act is designed to ensure the Police National Computer 
(PNC) remains an up-to-date and useful tool for Police to prevent crime by 
monitoring previous offenders and identifying suspects after an offence has 
been committed. The Home Office also notes that the Act is designed to 
deter sexual offenders from re-offending. 28 Unlike America, the legislation 
states that data contained in the register must be subject to a process of 
"selective disclosure". This involves releasing the information in a 
controlled fashion to police, officials and professionals such as doctors and 
teachers. Information can only be distributed to the public in certain 
circumstances, for example, to immediate neighbours, direct victims, co-
habitues of the offender, or when the offender poses a risk to a particular 
person or group29. Typically, the Police use "general awareness-raising 
measures within the community, without disclosing individual details", 
where possible. 30 Regulations introduced in 2001 also provide for the 
notification of people outside the United Kingdom if the offender chooses to 
travel overseas3 1. 
24 Sex Offenders Act 1997 (UK). 
25 
Home Office Policing and Reducing Crim e Unit Where are they now?: An evaluation of 
sex offender registration in England and Wales (Police Research Series Paper 126, 2000) I. 
26 
Ibid . "The Home Office points out that these offences do carry the possibility of life 
impri sonment and as such render these o ffender s subject to life licence on release" . 
27 Ibid , 2. 
28 Ibid . 
29 Sex Offenders Act 1997 (UK) . 
30 Ilome Office Policing and Reducing Crime Unit above n 25 40. 
31 ' ' Sex Offenders (Foreign Travel) Regulations 200 I (UK). 
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Prior to the Act's introduction, the Home Office indicated that public 
access to the register was not desirable. In a report entitled, Protecting the 
Public, the Home Office states that research conducted on the American 
system concluded publicly accessible registers actually drive offenders 
underground and decrease registration rates. 32 The report also notes that 
given offenders' high compliance rates in registering with Police in the 
United Kingdom (97%), it is largely unnecessary for the public to have 
access to the register. 33 While the report does not provide an explanation for 
this statement, it is likely that as the bulk of offenders are included on the 
register, the Police believe they are able to adequately monitor most sexual 
offenders without the need for widespread community notification. 
This attitude was mirrored by the legislature, which showed little 
support for public access to a register as the Bill moved through the House: 
"I have a feeling that the result would be more crimes, not fewer",34 
"notification must not become an additional punishment, it must be a 
preventive measure", 35 "[public notification] would be akin to branding 
them on the forehead", 36 "it would lead to mob rule",37 and ''the evil 
[vigilantism] could be even greater than that of a possible paedophile that is 
at large"38 . Numerous concerns were also raised as to what guidelines would 
be implemented to aid Police in their discretion as to when to disclose the 
information. 39 
C New Zealand Position 
Unlike America and the United Kingdom, New Zealand does not 
cmTently have legislation providing for either a registry of sex offenders or 
public notification of such offenders whereabouts. The Police Criminal 
Profiling Guidelines presently govern the distribution of information on 
32 Home Office Protecting the Public: Strengthening protection against sex offenders and 
reforming the law on sexual offences (The Stationary Office, London, 2002) 12. 
33 Ibid . 
34 (27 January 1996) 289 GBPD ser 6, 36. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid, 42. 
37 Ibid . 
38 Ibid , 45. 
39 (27 January 1996) 289 GBPD ser 6, 23-7 1. 
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dangerous sexual offenders.40 These guidelines are designed to balance the 
community's need for information, with the rights of individuals not to be 
treated ''unjustly, unfairly or oppressively".41 The guidelines suggest that 
offenders' profiles may only be distributed when the offender is an active, 
persistent criminal who is cun-ently engaged in significant offending 
42
. It is 
also noted that the profile must be confined to the information that 1s 
"necessary" and may only be distributed to a nan-ow target audience. 
43 
While publication is extremely rare, and the Police maintain that the 
guidelines are strictly complied with, recent media attention on the case of 
Brov1n v Attorney General (Brown) highlights the practical difficulties 
involved in discretion dictating the disclosure of such sensitive information. 
In the case of Brown, the court awarded convicted paedophile Ban-y Brown, 
$25,000 after he sued the Attorney General for a breach of his privacy by 
the New Zealand Police.44 A flier containing his personal details was 
distributed within the community, as an officer believed Brown posed a 
serious threat to neighbourhood children.45 However, Spear J held that 
Senior Sargent Cowan' s actions were "maverick"46 and failed to have "any 
real regard or account of the guidelines". 47 
While New Zealand does not have an official sex offender registry, a 
private citizen, Deborah Coddington, has compiled a register designed to 
notify society of the whereabouts of sexual offenders. The book, entitled 
Th e 1996 Paedophile and Sex Offender Index contains the names of 
offenders, their crimes, sentences, occupations and city of residence. 48 The 
book operates under the assumption that upon release from custody, 
offenders will continue to use the same name, live in the same city and seek 
40 
IN Bird Criminal Profiling Guidelines, (Prepared for the New Zealand Police, 27 July 
1993) . 
4 1 Ibid. 
42 Ibid, Guideline I . 
43 Ibid . 
44 
Bro1Vn v Attorney General [2006] OCR 630, para 96. 
45 [bid . 
46 Ibid. 
47 [bid , para 100. 
48 
Debra Coddington The 1996 Paedophile and Sex Offender Index (Alister Taylor 
Publishers, Auckland , 1996). 
12 
work in the same field. 49 It is also limited in that the information it contains 
was retrieved from court and media reports. Therefore, those offenders 
granted name suppression do not feature in the book. 5° Coddington 
published the index with the aim of "prevent[ing] merely one person from 
being a victim of a sex crime". She states, "an informed public is a safer 
one". The book has been widely published in New Zealand, and Coddington 
has since published both Australian and British versions of the Index. 51 
While the book is particularly popular, once featuring fifth in the New 
Zealand best sellers list, it has also received considerable criticism for its 
abuse of offenders' rights. 52 Nonetheless, it was this unofficial register that 
paved the way for Deborah Coddington's introduction of the Sex Offender 
Registry Bill in 2003. 
The Bill sits somewhere between the approaches of the American 
and United Kingdom legislation. Although based on the United Kingdom 
Sex Offenders Act and arguably closer to it than the American legislation, 
the Bill goes beyond the scope of the United Kingdom law. The Sex 
Offenders Act appears to be a rather more measured response to sexual 
offending and seems to have been carefully considered in light of offenders' 
rights. This is evidenced by the fact the Act provides clear guidelines as to 
when 'selective disclosure' to the public can occur. The Bill on the other 
hand, is rather ambiguous as to its disclosure requirements, and can be read 
as allowing significantly greater disclosure than that permitted under the 
Sex Offenders Act. 
The Sex Offender Registry Bill sought to establish a register of New 
Zealand offenders who committed an offence under sections 128 to l 44C of 
the Crimes Act 1961. 53 That registry would contain the name( s) used by the 
offender, his or her address, date of birth, the offences (or alleged offences) 
49 Jae Lemin The Privacy Law Implications of the 1996 Paedophile and Sex Offender Index 
(LLB Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington , 1997) 2. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Radio interview with Deborah Coddington (Kirn Hill , Radio New Zealand, 13 May 1996) 
transcript provided by Audio Monitor Services (Wellington). 
52 "Best Sellers List" ( 19 July 1996) National Business Review Wellington 5. 
53 Sex Offender Registry Bill 2003, no 2. 
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committed, reference to identifying information held on the offender and 
other identifying information prescribed by regulations54 . While the Bill did 
not advocate complete public access to the register, clause 13 of the Bill 
provides: 
(I) No person may disclose information provided in accordance 
with this Act or have access to the registry except in 
accordance with and for the purposes of this Act. 
(2) A member or employee of the Police and any person 
authorised by the Minister may have access to the registry and 
may collect, retain, and use information obtained from the 
registry for any purpose under this Act or for law enforcement 
purposes. 
The purpose of the Act is listed in clause 3 as being, "to assist the police in 
their investigation of sex offences, to reduce sexual offending, and thereby 
to contribute to public safety". 55 
Clause 13(1) effectively provides anyone with a "desire to reduce 
sexual offending" to access the register, such as, interest groups, politicians, 
local bodies and the media. 56 While the information must be used for "the 
purposes of the Act", the purposes listed are extremely wide and could 
extend to the publication of fliers, posters or billboards. 57 Without 
regulation as to what the information can be obtained for, details contained 
on the register can effectively be published in their entirety. 58 This problem 
is exacerbated by the Bill's failure to incorporate an offence for improper 
disclosure into the offences provision in clause 10. 59 The New Zealand 
Prisoners Aid and Rehabilitation Society suggest that such a provision is 
necessary and should be comparable to the offence provision in the Clean 
Slate Act for releasing information that should remain concealed. 60 
Similarly, clause 13(2) provides wide discretion for any member of 
the Police to use the information for "law enforcement purposes" or "any 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid , cl 3. 
56 New Zealand Law Society Sex Offender Regist,y Bill 2003 (Submission to Justice and 
Electoral Committee, Wellington 2003) 3. 
57 Ibid , 4 . 
58 Ibid . 
59 Ibid . 
60 New Zealand Prisoners Aid and Rehabilitation Society Sex Offender Registry Bill 2003 
(Submission to Justice and Electoral Committee, 2003) 11. 
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purpose under the Act". 61 Such a sweepmg guideline would in practice 
allow officers or even unsworn Police employees to disseminate information 
to the community whenever a sexual offender moves into the area. 62 This 
proviso therefore has parallels with the American system and would go 
some way towards giving New Zealand Megan's Law in practice, if not in 
theory. 
On the 30th of July 2003 the Bill was passed to the Justice and 
Electoral Committee for consideration. A variety of submissions were made, 
the bulk of which contained submissions condemning the Bill. On the 
whole, it was largely private submissions that offered their support, with 
many discussing the "epidemic proportions" of sexual offending63 and the 
necessity of protecting the nation' s children. Those in opposition to the bill 
primarily consisted of industry businesses that focused on specific clauses 
that were impracticable or would render the register ineffective. For 
example, the New Zealand Police and New Zealand Law Society were 
supportive of the spirit of the Bill but suggested that it was unlikely to 
achieve its purpose of assisting in the investigation of sexual offences and 
the elimination of suspects. 64 
Discussions regarding the legal ramifications of the Bill were 
primarily contained in submissions made by the Human Rights Commission 
and the Office of the Attorney General. Rather surprisingly, the Attorney 
General suggested the Bill was not inconsistent with the minimum 
guarantees of the rights and freedoms contained in BORA. 65 The 
submission noted that even if offenders could obtain protection under the 
right to withhold information in section 14, "the nature and extent of any 
inconsistency is such that, having regard to the Bill ' s objectives, it would be 
61 New Zealand Law Society, above n 56, 4. 
62 [bid. 
63 Sensible Sentencing Trust Submission Sex Offender Regist1y Bill 2003 (Submission to 
Justice and Electoral Committee, Wellington, 2003) I. 
64 New Zealand Police Sex Offender Regist,y Bill 2003 (Submission to Justice and Electoral 
Committee, Wellington, 2003) 4. 
65 Attorney General , above n 6, I . 
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'justified' in tem1s of section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act".
66 The Human 
Rights Commission, on the other hand, had considerable issues regarding 
the constitutionality of the Bill. It acknowledged the "understandable 
political and public sympathy" for such legislation, but suggested the 
government needed to act cautiously given its domestic and international 
obligations. 67 Consequently, issues were raised regarding the Bills 
inconsistency with the right to be presumed innocent, the right to privacy, 
the right to freedom of expression and the right to naturaljustice.
68 
Ultimately, the Bill was not passed after recommendations to that 
effect by the Justice and Electoral Committee on the 25
th of August 2006.
69 
The Committee gave an extremely briefreport as to its findings: 
70 
The previous Justice and Electoral Committee received advice from the 
Ministry of Justice and the Police. Both advised the committee that the 
Bill will not achieve its intended purpose in its current form. We 
concur with the advice received from the Ministry of Justice and the 
Police. We also consider that this bill will not achieve its intended 
purpose and recommend that it not proceed. 
Thus, New Zealand has been left to deal with the issue of community 
notification of dangerous offenders by way of the Police Criminal Profiling 
Guidelines and ultimately, Police discretion. The Committee's report 
highlighted the fact that the Bill, in its current form, was rejected because it 
would not be effective. Such a statement lends itself to the idea that, if 
amended, the Bill may have been passed. However, in reality, no 
amendments could be made to ensure the Bill would achieve its objectives 
and considerable changes are needed before it would ever be considered 
constitutional. 
III CONSTITUTIONALITY 
Unlike the United Kingdom, smce its introduction the American 
legislation has been subjected to considerable judicial scrutiny regarding its 
66 Ibid , 3. 
67 Human Rights Commission Sex Offender Regist1y Bill 2003 (Submission to Justice and 
Electoral Committee, Wellington , 2003) 1. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Justice and Electoral Committee, above n 3, 2. 
70 Ibid. 
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constitutionality. This can, in part, be attributed to a lack of legislative 
scrutiny as to its legality prior to its implementation. As New Zealand does 
not have any case law regarding the constitutionality of registers, an 
examination of the American courts' approach to the issue is informative 
despite its different legal context. 
A America 
While the American public lobbied strongly for publicly accessible 
sex offender registries, the various laws under which such access is 
guaranteed have not been easily accepted among the community. Over the 
years numerous cases have been brought challenging the constitutionality of 
such legislation. However, it is not just the public who have struggled with 
this issue. The courts themselves have continually dissented from each 
other. Some have suggested the legislation is constitutionally sound, while 
others have stated that they represent a flagrant breach of various 
constitutional rights, such as the ex post facto clause, the bill of attainder, 
the rights to privacy, due process, equal protection and the clauses against 
double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment. 
In an attempt to remove the legislation from "constitutional 
limbo", 71 in 2002 the United States Supreme Court announced it would be 
reviewing decisions on various state sex offender registration laws. The 
Court looked at two class action suits involving the Alaskan and 
Connecticut legislation, which dealt with breaches of the ex post facto and 
bill of attainder clauses. 72 Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled that both 
registries were consistent with the rights contained in the constitution. 73 The 
judgments permitted disclosure of the information on the internet and 
allowed registers to include the details of offenders who were convicted 
71 Arlway v Allorney General, 876 F. Supp 666, 692 (3 rd cir) Becket· J. 
72 Online News Hour Update: Supreme Court Watch Supreme Court Examines Sex 
Offender Registration Laws ( 13 November 2002) 
www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/scotus_ 11-13-02.html (last accessed 18 September 2007). 
73 Stateline High Court Frees States to Broaden Sex Offender Warnings (10 March 2003) 
www.stateline.org/liveNiewPage.action?siteNodeid= 136&languageld= I &contentld= 1518 
0 (last accessed 18 September 2007). 
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prior to the legislations formation. 74 Such an outcome has been criticised as 
allowing Megan's Law to be applied in "dangerous ways".
75 Lawrence 
Goldman, President of the National Association of Criminal Defence 
Lawyers stated, ''the court is saying you've done your time, you've done the 
punishment, you've successfully completed parole and probation, but we 
brand you with a stigma: sex criminal forever". 
76 
The following is a brief outline of the courts' approach to the various 
constitutional issues and how they have been addressed so as to justify the 
legislation. 
I Ex post facto clause 
The strongest challenge to Megan's law lies in whether it breaches 
article 1 of the United States Constitution. The ex post facto clause 
effectively prevents retrospective increases in an offender's punishment 
after he/she has been sentenced. 77 In the case of Smith v Doe, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeal struck down the Alaska Sex Offender Registration 
statute, holding it amounted to a retroactive punishment of offenders. 78 The 
Court based this decision on the fact that offenders were required to register 
four times a year for the rest of their lives, regardless of their future law 
abiding behaviour and low risk to society. 79 It was also noted that 
widespread disclosure of the information was unacceptable, as it resulted in 
damage to offenders both personally and professionally. 80 However, this 
decision was struck down by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal. The Court 
held that registering on a public database was not a punitive requirement, as 
only people with a genuine need the information, i.e. those in the offenders' 
community, will bother to access the register.81 The Supreme Court 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Suzanne DiNubile "Looking at the Legal Issues: Supreme Court Reviews Predator 
Registration" (2002) 8 Klaasaction Review 15. 
78 Smith v Doe (2003) 538 U.S 84 (SC); 259 F.3d 979. 
79 Suzanne DiNubile, above n 77, 15. 
80 Ibid . 
8 1 Ibid . 
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affirmed this decision 6 to 3, with Kennedy J stating that it was necessary 
for the legislation to be retroactive in order to be effective. 82 
11 Bill of attainder clause and right to due process 
Under the Bill of Attainder clause in article 1 of the Constitution the 
state may not "engage in legislative acts, no matter what their form, that 
apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a 
group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial 
trial". 83 In 2001, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that notification legislation 
violated offenders' due process rights as they are not given "a meaningful 
opportunity to argue that they do not represent a threat to the community 
before the information is disseminated on the internet". 84 A similar outcome 
was reached in the Court of Appeal hearing of Connecticut Department of 
Public Safety v Doe, which resulted in the prohibition of public access to the 
register. 85 However, this decision was overturned by the Supreme Court, 
who ruled 9 to O that publishing offenders' names, pictures and additional 
information, without giving them a hearing to determine dangerousness, was 
constitutional. 86 
111 Double jeopardy 
The clause against Double Jeopardy prohibits, "a second prosecution 
for the same offence after conviction ... and multiple punishments for the 
same offence". 87 The issue for the courts has thus been whether registration 
amounts to a punishment. The case of Artway v Attorney General stated that 
if the legislature had the actual or objective purpose of punishment in mind 
when forming 'Megan's Law' , or the effect of the legislation amounted to a 
punishment, then the legislation would fail constitutional analysis. 88 
However, the court ruled that the legislature did not intend to create an 
additional punishment as the law was simply designed to "enhance safety 
82 Smith v Doe, above n 78, 4 (SC) Kennedy J. 
83 The Constitution of the United States 1787 42 USC, article l. 
84 Suzanne DiNubile, above n 77, 15. 
85 Connecticut Department of Public Scifety v Doe (2003) 538 U.S I, 2 (SC) Rehnquist J. 
86 Ibid. 
87 The Constitution of the United States 1787 42 USC, 5th amendment. 
88 Artway v Attorney General, above n 71 , 1270. 
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and prevent and promptly resolve incidents". 89 Additionally, it was stated 
that the effect of the registration requirements were only minimal given the 
information was already within the public domain. Therefore, the legislation 
did not amount to a punishment or breach the double jeopardy clause. 90 
IV Equal protection 
The United States constitutional right to equal protection under the 
law is equivalent to the New Zealand right to freedom from discrimination. 
However, the American right provides that people 'similarly situated' 
should be treated alike, not that 'everyone' should be treated alike. 9 1 
Therefore, due to its construction, provided the legislature has a legitimate 
interest in classifying people differently, the clause will not be breached. 
The court in Artway v Attorney General held that the registration 
requirements were constitutional in this respect as there is a legitimate 
interest in singling out sexual offenders to protect vulnerable individuals 
from their attacks.92 
V The right to privacy 
In 2001, the District Court of New Jersey addressed the issue of 
breaches of sex offenders ' right to privacy. 93 It was held that an offenders 
precise home address was a ' non trivial ' privacy interest that was entitled to 
constitutional protection. However, information such as "an offenders' 
name, conviction, appearance, place of employment or school attended" was 
not afforded the same protection. This is primarily because the information 
is merely a compilation of truthful facts that are freely available, albeit less 
readily, as a matter of public record.94 Nonetheless, despite the fact that 
residential addresses attract a degree of privacy, the courts have ultimately 
ruled that this interest is "substantially outweighed by the state's compelling 
89 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 42 USC s 2 of amendment 
H.R. 2137. 
90 Artway v Attorney General, above n 71 , 708 . 
91 
City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center ( 1985) 473 U.S 432, 439 (SC). 
n A rtll'ay v Attorney General, above n 7 1, 692 . 
93 Paul P. v Verniero ( 1999) 170 F.3d 396; 227 F.3d I 07 (3'd cir) . 
94 Doe ,, Porlitz (1995) 142 N.J . I, 662 A. 2d 367 Wilentz CJ. 
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interest m disclosure". 95 Hence, the public interest m the information 1s 
greater than an offenders' right to privacy. 
B New Zealand 
Obviously, given the lack of registration and notification legislation, 
there is no applicable case law to indicate the Bill's consistency with our 
constitution. Whilst the case of Brown dealt with the issue of the publication 
of a sex offenders details, the case focused solely on breaches of privacy by 
an individual officer. What is needed is a consideration of how the courts 
would approach legislation that permitted the disclosure of such 
information. It is therefore necessary to determine how the New Zealand 
courts have previously approached the issue of reconciling conflicting 
rights. 
Section 5 of BORA deals specifically with "demonstrably 
justifiable" limitations on a right contained in the Act. 96 It is acknowledged 
that the right to privacy, though a fundamental stand alone right under 
domestic and international legislation, is not specifically contained in 
BORA. However, the right is tenuously encompassed in section 21 of the 
Act, being the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.97 
Similarly, it is generally accepted that freedom of expression "entails the 
right to say nothing or the right not to say certain things". 98 Thus, in some 
respects the notion of privacy is included in the right to non disclosure 
encapsulated within section 14. In the absence of other direction, there is no 
reason why discussion regarding the limiting of the common law right to 
privacy can not be approached using the framework developed in 
connection with section 5 of BORA. It is from this proposition that the 
following analysis stems. 
95 Paul P. v Verniero, above n 93 , 107. 
96 Duff v Communicado Ltd [ 1996] 2 NZLR 89. 
97 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 21. 
98 Slaight Communications v Davidson (1989) 59 DLR (4th) 416, 21; Wooley v Maynard 
(1977) 430 US 705; Attorney General legal Advice on Sex Offender Regist,y Bill: 
Consistency lVith the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Submission to Justice and 
Electoral Committee, Wellington, 2003) 2. 
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New Zealand case law regarding what approach the courts should 
adopt when faced with two conflicting rights is rather limited and confused. 
At times, a definitional approach to balancing rights has been adopted by the 
judiciary. This involves reading limitations into the definition of the right 
before proceeding to apply it to the factual situation.99 Such was the case in 
Re J, where an infants right not to be deprived of life under section 8, was in 
direct competition with his parents right to "manifest" their religion under 
section 15. 100 The Court of Appeal ultimately used a definitional approach 
to conclude that, it should define "the scope of the parental right under 
section 15 of the Bill of Rights Act to manifest their religion in practice, so 
as to exclude doing or omitting anything likely to place at risk the life, 
health or welfare of their children". 101 
However, at other times the courts have adopted an ad hoe approach 
to balancing, requiring a two stage analysis of the right. 102 The first requires 
the right to be defined as it would be naturally, without limitations. 103 A 
separate inquiry is then completed into what reasonable limits the right or 
freedom may be subject to. 104 This approach was adopted in Living Word 
Distributors, which saw the right to freedom of expression under section 14 
pitted against the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation under section 19(1 ). 105 The Court of Appeal overturned the 
Board's decision, concluding that it was reasonable to limit an individual's 
section 14 rights, in order to secure other rights and freedoms owed to 
members of society. 106 This approach is favoured by New Zealand legal 
commentators Butler and Butler, as section 1 of the Canadian Charter, 
which section 5 is based upon, is applied in this way. 107 
99 
Butler and Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2005) 122. 
100 
Re J (An Infant): Band B vDGSW[1996] 2 NZLR 134 (CA). 
10 1 Ibid, 146. 
102 Butler and Butler, above 11 99, 122. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
105 
Living Word Distributors v Human Rights Action Group [2000] 3 NZLR 570 (CA). 
106 Ibid. 
107 Butler and Butler, above 11 99, 122. 
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This paper approaches the issue of conflicting rights in an adhoc 
way, as it allows for a comprehensive assessment of the justification for 
limiting a right. As the New Zealand judiciary have had little chance to rule 
on theories regarding the equal and unequal limiting of rights, it will be 
necessary to look to international legislation and jurisprudence for 
guidance. 108 
IV WHEN IS A LIMIT REASONABLE AND JUSTIFIABLE? 
Section 5 of BORA prescribes that "the rights and freedoms 
contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject to reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society'', subject to section 4. 109 In order for a limitation to be prescribed by 
law it is necessary for it to be "expressed with sufficient precision in an Act 
of Parliament, subordinate legislation or the common law". 110 Although 
legislation can not be struck down by the New Zealand courts, judicial 
opinion as to legislative consistency with fundamental rights and freedoms 
has considerable social value. 111 
It is obvious from the wording of section 5 that the rights outlined in 
the Act are not absolute, yet it is also clear that the limitations must be 
necessary and fundamental. 112 The public expects the state to place limits on 
our rights and freedoms in order to ensure other essential rights and 
freedoms are not eroded. 113 For example, it is necessary to limit the right to 
free speech in situations where an absolute right would prevent an 
individual receiving a fair trial. Whether the limits placed on such rights are 
reasonable or justified forms a considerable portion of the law on rights. 114 
International jurisprudence is a helpful guide in detennining what amounts 
to a permissible limit on an existing right. It is, however, necessary to keep 
108 Butler and Butler, above n 99, 132. 
109 Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 4. 
110 Phillip Joseph , Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) para 26.4. 
111 Hansen vR [2007] NZSC 7, 113 (SC) Anderson J. 
11 2 Butler and Butler, above n 99, 133 . 
11 3 Hansen v R, above n 111, 9 Elias CJ. 
114 Butler and Butler, above n 99, 117. 
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in mind that a variety of limitation clauses exist, resulting in varying judicial 
approaches to interpretational constraints, or lack thereo £ 
115 
For this reason, 
this paper focuses on Canadian and South African limitation clauses which 
have a degree of similarity with section 5. 
A New Zealand 
What amounts to a reasonable limit has not been addressed by the 
New Zealand courts in any great depth, as BORA has primarily acted as a 
tool in order to aid the interpretation of words rather than a determination of 
what is reasonable. 116 Case law that does attempt to address the meaning of 
section 5 provides nothing more than a vague guideline of what is necessary 
to consider. Judicial commentary suggests it ultimately requires a difficult 
balance of "public policy analysis and value judgments on the part of the 
court" 117 and a ''utilitarian assessment of public welfare".
118 
The Court of Appeal in Moonen v Film & Literature Board of 
Review (Moonen No. 1) set out, not to define the phrases in section 5, but to 
provide a series of steps that are required by the section.
119 However, the 
result is a rather poorly constructed test that fails to take account of the 
actual purpose of section 5 and the relevant international jurisprudence and 
case law. 120 The court stated: 
121 
In determining whether an abrogation or limitation of a right or 
freedom can be justified in terms of section 5, it is desirable first to 
identify the objective which the legislature was endeavouring to 
achieve by the provision in question . The importance and significance 
of that objective must then be assessed. The way in which the objective 
is statutorily achieved must be in reasonable proportion to the 
importance of the objective. A sledgehammer should not be used to 
crack a nut. The means used must also have a rational relationship 
with the objective, and in achieving the objective there must be as little 
inte1ference as possible with the right or freedom affected . 
115 Butler and Butler, above n 99, 118. 
116 Butler and Butler, above n 99, 129. 
117 Minist,y of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260 (CA). Such an approach was then 
adopted in Hopkinson v Police [2004] 3 NZLR 704 (HC). 
118
1 L M Richardson " Rights Jurisprudence - Justice for All" in Phillip Joseph Essays on 
the Constitution (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 82. 
11 9 
Andrew Butler "Judicial Indications of Inconsistency - A New Weapon in the Bill of 
Rights Armoury?" (2000) NZLR 43. 
120 Butler and Butler, above n 99, 139. 
121 Moonen v Film & Literature Board of Revie\V (Moonen No 1) [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 16-17 
(CA) . 
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Furthermore, the limitation involved must be justifiable in the light of 
the objective. Of necessity value judgments will be involved ... 
Ultimately, whether the limitation in issue can or cannot be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society is a matter of 
judgement which the court is obliged to make on behalf of the society 
which it serves and after considering all the issues which may have a 
bearing on the individual case, whether they be social, legal, moral, 
economic, administrative, ethical or otherwise. 
The Court of Appeal in Moonen No. 2 does little to aid our 
interpretation of section 5, simply stating that the approach adopted in 
Moonen No. 1 was merely prescriptive and that there are a range of other 
approaches available. 122 
New Zealand's most recent authority on the approach to justification 
under section 5 is that of Hansen v R. 123 While the case is largely concerned 
with the interaction between sections 4, 5 and 6, judicial commentary as to 
the courts role under section 5 of BORA is still provided. Blanchard J states 
that if Parliament enacts a limitation upon a certain right, it must be taken to 
have viewed that limit as reasonable and justified in a free and democratic 
society. 124 He suggests that, while the courts are not bound by the Attorney 
General's assessment of a piece of legislation or Parliament's concurrence, 
judicial scrutiny of any legislation must take into account these views. 125 
Ultimately, the court must ask itself ''whether the legislature was 
entitled ... to come to the conclusion under challenge. It is only if Parliament 
was not so entitled that the court should find the limit to be unjustified". 126 
B Canada 
The White Paper on the Bill of Rights Act states that section 5 was 
based on section I of the Canadian Charter, which reads: 12 7 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights 
and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits 
122 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review (Moonen No 2) [2002] 2 NZLR 754; 6 
HRNZ 623, para 15 (CA). 
123 Hansen v R, above n 111, 7. 
124 Ibid, 53, Blanchard J. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid, 58, Blanchard J. 
127 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms RSC 1982, s I . 
25 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified m a free and 
democratic society. 
The comparable nature of our law thus makes it necessary to consider 
Canadian case law and jurisprudence as to what limitations can be 
demonstrably justified. 128 The most valuable authority in this regard is that 
of R v Oakes. 129 Dickson CJ outlined the values and principles that should 
be prioritised in a free and democratic society: 
130 
[T]o name but a few, respect for the inherent dignity of the hW11an 
person, commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation of a 
wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith 
in social and political institutions which enhance the participation of 
individuals and groups in society. 
He also suggests that at times it will be necessary to limit the rights and 
freedoms contained in the Charter when "their exercise would be inimical to 
the realisation of collective goals of fundamental importance".
131 The 
judgement ultimately outlines two criteria that must be satisfied in order for 
a limit to be justifiable: 132 
( 1) The purpose in limiting the right must be sufficiently important to 
justify overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom; and 
(2) The limit must be reasonable and demonstrably justified. 
1 Sufficiently important 
In dete1mining whether the limit is sufficiently important it 1s 
necessary to consider the "cardinal values" it embodies. 133 R v Oakes 1s 
authority for the proportion that in order for a limitation to be sufficiently 
important: 134 
The standard must be high to ensure that trivial objectives or those 
discordant with the principles of a free and democratic society do not 
gain protection. At a minimum, an objective must relate to societal 
concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic 
society. 
128 Hansen vR, above n 11 l , 14 Elias CJ. 
129 R v Oakes [1986] I SCR 103 (SCC). 
130 Ibid , 136. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid , 140. 
131 Hansen v R , above n 111 , 14 Elias CJ. 
134 R v Oakes, above n 129, 138-139. 
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It should be noted that it is the purpose of the limitation, not the law as a 
whole, which must to be considered. 135 While the phrase "pressing and 
substantial" implies a rather high threshold, in reality it is rare for the test to 
result in a breach of the Charter. Hence, commentators Butler and Butler 
suggest that whilst the importance of the purpose should be considered, it is 
merely one factor within a proportionality inquiry. 136 
II Reasonable and demonstrably justified 
R v Chaulk summaries the R v Oakes justification mqmry into 
proportionality as: 13 7 
The means to achieve the objective must: 
(a) be "rationally connected" to the objective and not be arbitrary, 
unfair or based on irrational considerations; 
(b) impair the right or freedom in question as "little as possible"; and 
(c) be such that their effects on the limitation of rights and freedoms 
are proportional to the objective. 
These considerations have been built upon by subsequent case law that 
determined that some of these factors were too demanding or stringent. 138 
The case of Edward Books, for example, held that the focus should not be 
on impairing the right "as little as possible" but on preventing "excessive 
impairment" of the right. 139 Thus, the legislature does not have to adopt the 
least intrusive method of achieving the objective; rather they must have 
chosen a method from ''within a range of reasonable alternatives". 140 
Similarly, the case of Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium states it is not 
necessary to provide scientific evidence as to the harm caused, it is 
sufficient to provide a reasoned apprehension of such harm. 141 
In order to detennine what amounts to a proportional response the 
case of Irwin Toy states that consideration must be given as to how wide the 
limitation must be in order to achieve its objective. 142 It is also noted that the 
135 Butler and Butler, above n 99, 143. 
136 Ibid . 
137 R v Chaulk [1990] 3 SCR 1303 (SCC). 
138 Butler and Butler, above n 99, 143 . 
139 R v Edwards books & Art Limited [ 1986] 2 SCR 713 (SCC). 
140 RJR-MacDonald Inc [1995] 3 SCR 199, para 160 (SCC) McLachlin J. 
141 Little Sisters book and Art Emporium [2000] 2 SCR 1120 (SCC). 
142 !,win toy vAttorney-General (Quebec) [1989] I SCR 927,999 (SCC). 
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effectiveness of the limitation in achieving that objective must be 
discussed. 143 Ultimately, the inquiry requires a balancing exercise in respect 
of the context in which the right arises, and what level of protection should 
be accorded to that right. 144 
"Some limits on rights and freedoms protected by the Charter will be 
more serious than others in terms of the nature of the right or freedom 
violated, the extent of the violation, and the degree to which the 
measures which impose the limit entrench upon the integral principles 
of a free and democratic society''. 
C South Africa 
Similar to that of New Zealand and Canada, section 36(1) of the 
South African Constitution 1996 contains a limiting provision that states: 145 
TI1e rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in tem1s of the law 
of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom , taking into account all relevant factors, including 
- (a) the nature of the right ; (b) the importance of the purpose of the 
limitation ; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the 
relationship between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less 
restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
Unlike the Canadian decision of R v Oakes, the South African courts have 
developed an approach based entirely on a proportionality assessment. The 
inquiry is founded on the notion that "the more serious the impact of the 
measure or the right, the more persuasive or compelling the justification 
must be". 146 Such an approach is used as the courts have acknowledged that 
"differing rights have different implications for. .. an open and democratic 
society based upon freedom and dignity" and therefore, there is not an 
absolute standard that can be used to determine reasonableness. 147 The 
courts must engage in "a nuanced and context sensitive form of 
balancing". 148 
143 Ibid. 
144 R v Chaulk, above n 137, 134 l. 
14 5 
South African Constitution 1996, s 36(1) (SA). 
146 
State v Mamamela (2000) 5 BCLR 491, para 32 (SACC). 
147 
State v Makwanyane ( 1995) 6 BCLR 665, 708 (SACC) Chaskasson P . 
148 
Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education (2000) 9 BHRC 53 , 67 
(SACC). 
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D Conclusions as to when a limit is reasonable and justifiable 
Essentially the New Zealand approach to determining when a limit 
will be reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society can be summarised as follows. When rights or freedoms conflict 
with each other the situation can be addressed using the framework provided 
by section 5 of BORA. Such an inquiry begins from the position that 
"neither right has precedence over the other". 149 International case law then 
suggests it is then necessary to complete a balancing exercise based on the 
relevant contextual factors. Thus, consideration must be given to: 150 
(1) the purpose and significance of the rights; 
(2) the weight of the good that the limit gives effect to; 
(3) an assessment of proportionality; and 
( 4) general concerns such as "preserving room for legislative 
choice, uncertainty, the limits of law, and the role of the 
judiciary". 
Whilst New Zealand case law regarding the topic is rather limited, McGrath 
J in Hansen v R notes that the approach used in R v Oakes "continues to be a 
workable basis for applying section 5 of BORA". 151 A similar inquiry, that 
encapsulates the flexible approach in Oakes is made in the New Zealand 
case of Ministry of Transport v Noort: 152 
ln the end an abriding inquiry under s5 is a matter of weighing: 
(1) The significance in the particular case of the values underlying 
the Bill of Rights Act; 
(2) The importance in the public interest of the intrusion on the 
particular right protected by the Bill of Rights Act; 
(3) The limits sought to be placed on the application of the [Bill 
of Rights] Act provision in the particular case; and 
(4) The effectiveness of the intrusion i11 protecting the interest put 
forward to justify those limits. 
V ARE SEX OFFENDER REGISTER/ES DEMONSTRABLY 
JUSTIFIED? 
There are a variety of rights that conflict with various aspects of the 
Bill and thus ultimately the right to free speech. New Zealand legislation 
raises different issues to that of American law. Most notable is the 
149 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 All ER 995. 
150 Butler and Butler, above n 99, 149. 
151 Hansen v R, above n 111 , 92, McGrath J. 
152 Minist,y of Transport v Noori, above n 117, 283. 
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difference in emphasis on the right to freedom of expression, and as a 
consequence, the weight given to the right to privacy. In America, freedom 
of expression is of the utmost impo1tance and thus, residential addresses and 
criminal conviction data is freely available. 153 Public notification schemes 
simply serve to make such information more accessible. In New Zealand, 
the right to freedom of expression is subject to greater restrictions and as 
such, criminal records are relatively more difficult to obtain and can-y a 
higher expectation of privacy. 154 This is where the primary conflict ofrights 
lie and therefore discussion into the degree of privacy rights held by 
offenders will form the bulk of this paper's inquiry into constitutionality. 
onetheless, it is wo1th noting that submissions by the Human 
Rights Commission allude to additional breaches of rights by the Bill. The 
right to be presumed innocent under s25( c), for example, is infringed upon 
as the register includes those individuals who are merely cautioned for an 
offence. Similarly, issues arise regarding the right to due process under 
article 14 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR). Arguments can be made that the right has been violated by 
including individuals on the register who are in the process of appealing 
their conviction or whose convictions have been overturned by a higher 
court. However, issues of consistency with these rights will not be discussed 
as the conflicts can largely be addressed through amending the Bill. 
It is also impo1tant to note that other issues raised by vanous 
American courts do not present themselves as hurdles to the New Zealand 
Bill. Unlike the American legislation, the New Zealand Bill is not 
retrospective, and thus does not breach s26( I) of BORA. Similarly, unlike 
America, the New Zealand right to non-discrimination does not raise issues 
of consistency with the legislation. Section 19 of BORA states that citizens 
have a right to be free from discrimination on the basis of any of the 
prohibited grounds of discrimination in the Human Rights Act 1998. The 
153 Doe v City of Ne1v York, ( 1994) 15 F. 3d 264, 268 (2d Cir). 
154 
Jae Lemin The Privacy Law Implications of the 1996 Paedophile and Sex Offender 
Index (LLB Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 1997). 
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listed prohibited grounds, however, do not include any reference to 
discrimination on the basis of conviction or type of offence. 
For the sake of completeness, it should be mentioned that, like 
America, the protection against double jeopardy in section 26(2) of the Act 
will not be breached by the legislation. The New Zealand right to double 
jeopardy provides that "no one who has been finally acquitted or convicted 
of, or pardoned for an offence shall be tried or punished for it again". 155 In 
the case of Harder v Director of Land Transport Safety, Laurenson J held 
that a sentence handed down to enforce the criminal law, plus an additional 
activity required to protect the public, did not amount to double jeopardy. 156 
However, the latter statement was qualified by the notion that the additional 
activity must not be designed to punish the offender. 157 As the purpose of 
the Bill is to "assist the police in their investigation of sex offences, to 
reduce sexual offending, and thereby to contribute to public safety"; 158 the 
registration requirements of the Bill will not amount to double jeopardy. 
A The right to privacy in New Zealand 
It is often unequivocally stated that "these types of offenders have 
infringed on the freedoms and rights of their victims, and in so doing, have 
forfeited any rights enjoyed by other members of the community" .159 In 
particular, those in favour of sex offender registries argue that, "the rights of 
the children - the most vulnerable group in our society - must come before 
the privacy rights of convicted criminals" . 160 It is therefore necessary, first 
to consider the degree of privacy rights offenders actually have in respect of 
their personal details, and then to determine whether these rights are 
outweighed by the public interest in disclosure of such information. 
155 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 26(2). 
156 Harder v Director a/Land Transport Safety ( I 998) 5 llRNZ 343, 34 7, Lauren son J. 
157 Ibid . 
158 Sex Offender Registry Bill 2003, no 2, cl 3. 
159 Nigel Waters, Office o f Federal Privacy Commi ssioner "Paedophilia: Policy and 
Prevention" (Australian Institute of Criminology, Sydney, 14-15 April 1997) 3. 
160 (27 January 1996) 289 GBPD ser 6, 23, 41. 
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I International Obligations 
The right to privacy is considered a fundamental right and is offered 
protection by article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 
and article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
1966: 161 
( 1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or w1lawful interference with 
his privacy, family, home, or correspondence, nor to unlawful 
attacks on his honour and reputation. 
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks. 
Protection offered by aiiicle 17 only prevents intentional, unlawful and false 
attacks on individuals' honour and reputation. 16
2 As any information that 
would be contained in a register is legally collected and correct, sex 
offender registers would not be deemed an attack on offenders' honour and 
reputation. Therefore, any discussion into breaches of international 
obligations of privacy would need to focus on whether the register is in fact 
"arbitrary", and thus unjustifiable. 163 
II Domestic Obligations 
In New Zealand, the right to privacy, though still in its formative 
stages, is relatively settled and consists of a rather comprehensive set of 
privacy laws designed to prevent abuses of individuals' right to privacy. 
Actions can be brought for a breach of 164 
"the tort [ of privacy] , the privacy principles developed by the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority, the legislative requirements for 
collection, storage and use of personal information set out in the 
Privacy Act 1993, possibly the requirements of the Harassment Act 
1997, and a number of miscellaneous legal requirements" . 
While the Privacy Act 1993 is designed to provide guidelines as to 
disclosure of private information by the state and its agencies, sex offenders 
will be unable to challenge the legitimacy of a register under this Act. 
Clause 14 of the Bill explicitly prevents the Privacy Act from applying to 
16 1 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 
171 , art 17. 
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the disclosure provisions. 165 Accordingly, the only possible avenue for 
offenders to challenge their inclusion on a register lies with tort, and thus 
the remainder of this paper will focus entirely on tortuous liability. 
The New Zealand tort was established in 1986, when the case of 
Tucker v News Media Ownership acknowledged that a legal right to privacy 
did in fact exist. 166 Unlike the United Kingdom, which recognises this right 
through an extension of the action for breach of confidence, New Zealand 
has remained comparatively true to the traditional action espoused in the 
case of Coco v AN Clark. 167 The courts have chosen to develop a separate 
tort that directly addresses alleged breaches of privacy. As the tort is entirely 
a creature of judge-made law, it is best analysed by considering its 
foundation cases. However, for the sake of succinctness the state of the law 
as it is today will simply be outlined. 
There is a collection of early case law that contributed to the 
formation of the New Zealand tort, but it is the case of Hosking v Runting 
that has established the approach currently used. The majority decision saw 
the creation of two fundamental elements: 168 
(I) The existence of facts in respect of which there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy; and 
(2) Publicity given to those private facts that would be considered 
highly offensive to an objective reasonable person. 
Added to this test, is the notion that a legitimate public concern m the 
disclosure of the private facts can, despite being considered highly 
offensive, allow the information to be released to the public. 169 Such a 
concession was made in order to ensure the toti did not breach BORA by 
imposing unjustifiable restrictions on the right to freedom of expression. 170 
165 Sex Offender Registry Bill 2003, no 2, cl 14. 
166 Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd [ 1986] 2 NZLR 716, 732 (HC). 
167 Coco v A. N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [ 1969] RPC 41. 
168 Hosking v Runting [2005] I NZLR l , para 117. 
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III Do offenders have a right to privacy? 
First, in determining whether an offender has an enforceable privacy 
right, it is important to remember that such a right will only be protected by 
the tort when there is widespread publicity of the information.
17 1 Hosking v 
Run ting does little to clarify the meaning of the word 'widespread', beyond 
indicating that publication to just one person will not be sufficient.
172 
Nonetheless, if police maintain a register and distribute information to even 
a small select group of people it likely that an arguable case could be made 
in respect of a breach of privacy. 
(a) Is there a reasonable expectation of privacy? 
In Hosking v Runting, the majority determines if an expectation of 
privacy exists by way of an inquiry into whether the information is a private 
fact. 173 Whether the criminal convictions and personal details of a sex 
offender are capable of attaining the status of private facts is rather 
contentious, and lies at the heart of the debate surrounding sex offender 
registries. It is clear that some matters are inherently private, such as 
domestic, personal and family affairs, and some matters are inherently 
public, such as marriage, divorce, and ownership of land. 174 However, 
Gleeson CJ in Australian Broadcasting Corporation notes, "there is no 
bright line which can be drawn between what is private and what is not". 175 
In order to determine the privacy value of facts that are not inherently 
obvious, we must apply "contemporary standards of morals and 
behaviours". 176 
( i) Residential Address 
Legal advice on the Bill given by the Attorney General stated that 
requiring an offender to register their residential address was consistent with 
171 Ibid, para 125. 
172 Ibid, para 125. 
173 Ibid, para 256. 
174 E. Paton-Simpson "Invasion of privacy by the publication of private facts" (1998) MLR 
318 . 
175 Australian Broadcasting Co,poration v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (200 I) 
208 CLR 199, para 42 (HC) Gleeson CJ. 
176 Ibid. 
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BORA. 177 This advice was based on the notion that "a statement of an 
individual's name and address is not sufficiently expressive so as to attract 
the protection afforded by section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act". The 
protection referred to is the right to remain silent or not say certain things. 178 
Hence, sex offenders cannot refrain from disclosing their residential address 
on the basis that it breaches their right to non disclosure under section 14. 
Such an approach is supported by the judgment of Regina v Holman, which 
held that requiring a person to complete a census form was not a breach of 
their rights. 179 
Similarly, vanous American courts have declared that no pnvacy 
interest lies in a registrant's home address, 180 as the information is readily 
available in public records, such as telephone books and electoral 
registers. 181 However, American case law on the area is confused, and at 
other times the courts have acknowledged that "[in] an organized society, 
there are few facts that are not at one time or another divulged to 
another". 182 Thus, a right to privacy does not disappear simply because of a 
controlled disclosure. In United States Department of Defence, the court 
suggests it is "reluctant to disparage the privacy of the home, which is 
accorded special consideration in the Constitution, law, and traditions". 183 
Hence, a degree of constitutional protection has since been accorded to a 
"non-trivial privacy interest" within residential addresses. 184 
The New Zealand judiciary, on the other hand, have had little chance 
to consider the privacy interests attached to residential addresses. In New 
Zealand's sole case involving the disclosure of a sex offenders' address, 
Brown, the court stated that for some purposes an address is capable of 
177 Attorney General , above n 6, 2. 
178 Slaight Communications v Davidson ( 1989) 59 DLR (4th) 416, 21; Wooley v Maynard 
(1977) 430 us 705. 
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180 Russell v Gregoire (1997) 124 F.3d 1079, 1094 (9111 Cir). 
18 1 Doe v Portitz, above n 94, 56, Wilentz CJ. 
182 [bid , 57. 
183 United States Department of Defence v Federal Labour Relations Authority (1994) 510 
U.S 487,501. 
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being considered a private fact. McGechan J notes that this is particularly 
the case when the address belongs to a convicted sexual offender, who 
''unquestionably" has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 185 He suggests 
this expectation arises as an offender is unlikely to anticipate that their 
address will be publicly distributed when it is provided in the course of a 
legitimate criminal investigation. 186 This approach is consistent with that of 
the current Police Criminal Profiling Guidelines which state that their must 
be "exceptional circumstances" before an offender's address can be 
published. 187 
(ii) Criminal Convictions 
Whether criminal convictions are considered private facts is less 
clear. The New Zealand courts subscribe to the principle of open justice, in 
which the courts are accessible to the public, and the media are free to report 
on cases under section 25(a) of BORA. 188 It thus follows that convictions 
are a public fact. This, however, is not always the case. Legislation exists in 
order to allow some convictions to become private again after a period of 
time. 189 Whilst almost all sexual offenders will not fall within the eligibility 
criteria of the Criminal Records (Clean Slate) Act 2004, such legislation 
acknowledges that privacy concerns exist and that public disclosure of 
convictions may have severe implications on an offender's future. 190 
In America, individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in respect of matters of public record as they are not considered 
private facts. 191 However, in New Zealand, privacy interests can exist 
despite information being publicly available. 192 The approaches differ as 
information regarding a criminal conviction is freely available in America, 
and thus public notification schemes simply make the information more 
185 Brown v Attorney General, above n 44, para 75 (DC) McGechan J. 
186 Ibid , para 75. 
187 
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189 Television New Zealand Ltd v Rogers [2007] 1 NZLR 156, 169 (SC). 
19° Criminal Records (Clean Slate) Act 2004. 
191 Doe v. City of New York, above 11 153, 268. 
192 Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd, above 11 166, 735. 
36 
accessible. 193 Whereas in New Zealand, information regarding criminal 
records is relatively more difficult to obtain and therefore carries a higher 
expectation of privacy. For example, in order to acquire an individuals' 
criminal record from the court, it is necessary to have a "genuine and proper 
reason" to obtain the information and to have knowledge of the date and 
place of conviction. 194 Alternatively, you can apply to the Department of 
Courts for the information with written consent from the criminal record 
holder. 195 
Ultimately, New Zealand case law indicates that over time 
convictions may become private again, 196 it is simply a "matter of degree 
and circumstance as to what should become private information". 197 Tucker 
v News Media Ownership is authority for the proposition that, the greater 
the length of time that has elapsed since a conviction, the greater the 
expectation of privacy that exists. 198 This approach is consistent with that of 
the United Kingdom courts. In the case of Green Corns v CLA Verley 
Group, the court held that there is no recognisable privacy interest in a 
conviction alone, however, when compiled into a register a degree of 
privacy exists as the conviction is prevented from fading into non 
existence. 199 Therefore, it seems criminal convictions can attract a degree of 
privacy, but the degree of protection is likely to vary between individuals, 
and in most cases will be minimal. 
(iii) Compilation of other information 
Aside from an offenders address and convictions, a sex offender 
registry can contain information such as an offender's name, race, age, birth 
date, weight, height and hair colour. It has been argued that, despite the 
information being publicly available, an expectation of privacy is created by 
its compilation into a single source. It is suggested that the combination of 
193 Jae Lemin, above n 154, 9. 
194 Ibid. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd, above n 166, 73 5. 
197 Brown v Attorney General, above n 44, para 67 (DC) McGechan J. 
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inoffensive facts enables the reader to build a detailed picture of an 
individuai. 200 However, the American courts have declined to recognise 
such a right, stating "an offender's name, appearance, place of employment 
or school attended", are not afforded the same protection as a residential 
address. This decision was based on the fact the information was merely a 
compilation of truthful facts that were freely available as a matter of public 
record. 201 
The New Zealand judiciary has not had a chance to address the issue 
of whether privacy rights can be attributed to a compilation of otherwise 
innocuous facts about an individual. The United States Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that "the compilation of otherwise hard-to-obtain information 
alters the privacy interests implicated".202 However, this type of information 
is relatively easy to obtain as it exists within the public domain. An 
offender's name, for example, is an inherently public fact. As is his or her 
birth date, which can be compared to marriage, divorce and death dates that 
are also inherently public facts . 203 Case law also suggests that information 
regarding an individuals' race, height and hair colour will not attract a 
reasonable expectation of privacy as the information can be obtained upon 
visually citing an individuai. 204 "Because a person's physical appearance is 
necessarily and constantly exposed to public view, no person can have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his appearance".205 Therefore, any 
expectation of privacy recognized by the courts in this compilation of 
information is likely to be minimal. 
(b) Is disclosure highly offensive? 
What is considered highly offensive has been the subject of debate 
through out the torts development. Hosking v Runting recently determined 
that it is the publicity given to the facts that must be considered highly 
200 Doe v Portitz, above n 94, 59, Wilentz CJ. 
201 Ibid. 
202 US Department of Justice v Reporters Commitlee for Freedom of the Press (1989) 489 
U.S 749, 763 . 
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offensive, not the facts themselves. 206 What is required is a public disclosure 
that is truly harmful, distressing or humiliating. 207 It was established in the 
case of P v D, that what will be deemed highly offensive will be determined 
from the perspective of an objective reasonable person in the shoes of the 
claimant.208 Thus, it is necessary to consider whether an individual who has 
been convicted of a sexual offence would find it highly offensive to have 
that conviction and their personal details publicly distributed. Logically, 
offenders who have completed their punishment and are attempting to 
reintegrate themselves back into the community would be offended by such 
dis closure. 
Nonetheless, Hosking v Runting also notes that whether a disclosure 
1s considered offensive is coloured by the degree of an individual's 
expectation of privacy. 209 Over the years, the opinion of the American 
courts has varied as to the degree of expectation attached to offenders' 
privacy rights. Some courts have labelled the rights, "significant" or 
"important" and others have categorised them as, "relatively modest" or 
"minimal". 210 Aronson v Internal Revenue Services notes that the degree of 
privacy expectation can ultimately be determined by a consideration as to 
the effects of such disclosure. 211 In this case, a real threat of harassment and 
vigilantism exists when details of an offender's criminal convictions, 
coupled with their residential address, are publicised. It therefore follows 
that disclosure would be considered highly offensive. Although, the degree 
of offensiveness would be greater in respect of an offender's address, as it 
represents the basis of the threat. 
Thus, sex offenders do have a right to privacy, and they can expect 
their residential addresses to remain private in these circumstances. They 
can also expect their convictions and other personal details to have some 
degree of protection. Nonetheless, they must also accept that non disclosure 
206 Hosking v Runting, above n 164, para 117. 
207 Ibid , para 126. 
208 p v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591 , 601. 
209 Hosking v Runting, above n 168, para 256. 
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of this information is subject to demonstrably justified limitations. It is the 
degree of these limitations that will be addressed in pati V( c) of this paper. 
B The conflicting right: Freedom of expression 
Section 14 of BORA provides that, "everyone has the right to 
freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart 
information and opinions of any kind, in any form". 212 This right is also 
protected within international legislation such as aiiicle 19 of the Universal 
Declai·ation of Human Rights, article 19 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, and article 10 of the European Convention on 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. "It embraces free speech, the sanctity of 
an individual's opinion, a free press, the transmission and receipt of ideas 
and information, the freedom of expression in art and other forms, the 
ability to receive ideas from elsewhere, and even the right to silence". 213 
The right acts as dual protection to citizens. 2 14 It encompasses the right of 
individuals to not be arbitrarily restricted in their expression.2 15 While at the 
same time it provides individuals with a collective right to receive 
information subject only to prescribed limitations; and places a duty upon 
the government, as controllers of information, to disclose it unless otherwise 
prohibited. 2 16 
Case law suggests that the right to freedom of expression is "as wide 
as human thought and imagination". 21 7 Thus, in its purest form freedom of 
expression exists without limitations. Nonetheless, the right is not absolute 
in any jurisdiction in the world. Although, it's legal position and importance 
varies between countries. Under the first amendment of the United States 
Constitution, the right is theoretically absolute, and the state is burdened 
with the duty of proving a limitation is necessary before the right ca11 be 
212 Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14. 
213 
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(8x ford University Pres~, Melbourne, 2003). 
Human nghts Comm1ss1011 Human Rights in New Zealand Today: The right to.freedom 
of opinion and expression - New Zealand Action Plan for Human Rights (Wellington , 
2004) chapter 8. 
2 15 Ibid . 
216 Ibid . 
217 Moonen No 1, above n 121, 9 (CA) Tipping J. 
40 
restricted.2 18 Whereas, in New Zealand the right is inherently restricted by 
demonstrably justifiable limitations prescribed in section 5 of BORA. It is 
for this reason, it is often suggested that the right to freedom of expression 
plays a defining role in determining the scope of other rights.2 19 For 
example, in this case it is necessary consider whether: (1) offenders' right to 
pnvacy can be construed so as to provide convincing reasons for a 
limitation to be placed on the right to freedom of expression, and (2) 
whether the public interest in freedom of expression can be constructed so 
as to provide a justifiable restriction on the right to privacy. 
C What limits can reasonably be placed on offenders rights? 
After outlining the various rights at play, and indicating how they 
conflict, it becomes necessary to detennine what limits can justifiably be 
placed on each right under section 5 of BORA. In completing this task 
Hansen v R suggests, it is important to go beyond merely interpreting the 
rights involved.220 This paper undertakes to consider the purpose and 
significance of the rights at stake, the objectives of the limitation, the 
importance of the public interest in the limitation and whether any 
restriction would be a proportional response, including whether the Bill 
achieves it's objectives and whether any restriction is excessive. 
I Limitation sought to be placed on the rights 
Often arguments are made, that limiting offenders rights, even to a 
great extent, is justifiable given the considerable threat they pose to the 
community. Such an approach is completely incompatible with that of 
human rights legislation that aims to protect human dignity. It is also 
inconsistent with offenders' goals of successful long term rehabilitation and 
reintegration into the community. In determining what is a reasonable 
restriction, it is first essential to assess "whether the limitation is 
demonstrably justified, not whether some limitation is justified". 221 Hence, 
2 18The Constitution of the United States 1787 42 USC, l st amendment. 
2 19 Human Rights in New Zealand Today: The right to freedom of opinion and expression 
New Zealand Action Plan fo r Human Rights, above n 2 11 , chapter 8. 
220 Hansen v R, above n 11 l , 23, Elias CJ. 
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consideration must be given to the specific limits the Bill seeks to place 
upon offenders' right to privacy. 222 
The explanatory note of the Bill acknowledges that a conflict arises 
between the right to privacy and the right to freedom of expression. Yet it 
states that, "the protection of the privacy of sex offenders must give way to 
the protection of the public from such offending. That is, in this area the 
community's interests must come first". 223 Under clause 13, the Bill 
proposes to prioritise the right to freedom of expression by permitting the 
disclosure of information in various circumstances. Offenders' privacy 
rights are limited by allowing anyone with a "desire to reduce sexual 
offending" or "contribute to public safety'' to access the register. 224 This 
proposed limitation is extensive given that no guidance is provided as to 
what use may be made of the information, beyond suggesting it must be 
used "for the purposes of the Act".225 Similarly, the information has the 
capacity to be published widely by Police officers or unswom staff 
members, who are not restricted as to what use they make of the 
information, beyond it being "for law enforcement purposes" or to "aid in 
police investigations". 226 While it is acknowledged that if the Bill 
proceeded the courts are likely to narrowly interpret clause 13, in its current 
form, offenders' privacy rights are substantially limited, and open to abuse. 
In the Bill's explanatory note the drafters attempt to justify this 
restriction on the basis that: 227 
"the Bill maintains a balance between these competing concerns in 
various ways: for example, it applies only to the extent necessary, it 
does not apply to offences and offenders in the distant past, it strictly 
limits access to the registry which should be seen as a crime fighting 
and law enforcement tool , and it provides a means by which offenders 
can have erroneous information corrected and be struck from the record 
in the event that they are pardoned". 
222 Minist, y of Transport v Noori, above n 117, 283. 
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Whether this balance is appropriately struck can only be considered in light 
of an inquiry into whether the limitation is a proportional response to the 
potential harm or threat to society. 
II Objective of the Bill 
Moonen No. 1 state there must be a rational connection between the 
restriction placed on the right and the harm sought to be prevented or 
remedied. 22 8 In this case, clause 3 of the Bill outlines the purpose of the 
legislation as, "to assist the Police in their investigation of sex offenders, to 
reduce sexual offending, and thereby to contribute to public safety". 229 Each 
of these goals is honourable and of "pressing and substantial importance"230 
in a modem society, that relies on the government to fulfil these objectives 
as part of the social contract. As such, if these objectives are effective, they 
may arguably be sufficiently important to justify the restriction of 
constitutional rights. 
(a) Assisting Police in their investigations 
Currently, the Police do not always have access to a reliable, up-to-
date database of offenders' residential addresses. 23 1 This has been sited as a 
reason for lengthy investigation times. 232 The Bill is designed to provide 
Police with a complete register of names and addresses of sexual offenders, 
in order to decrease the time it takes to identify and make contact with 
offenders for investigatory interviews. 233 It also aims to speed up the 
process of eliminating suspects during inquiries.234 Additionally, the Bill 
also provides for disclosure of this information to the public when it 1s 
necessary, to assist in their investigations. 23 5 However, no guidance 1s 
provided as to precisely when disclosure is reasonable and who the 
information can be disclosed to . 
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(b) Reduce sexual offending 
The Bill's explanatory note suggests it is designed to deter offenders 
from future offending. 236 Offender rehabilitation agency, STOP, notes that 
when an offender knows that people around him/her are aware of their 
previous offending, they are less likely to offend.237 "Registration places a 
defendant on notice that when subsequent sexual crimes are committed in 
the area where he lives, he may be subject to investigation. This may well 
have a prophylactic effect, deterring him for future sexual crimes".238 
Clause 13 of the Bill provides for disclosure of information to the 
community in the hopes of preventing offenders from re-offending. 239 The 
United Kingdom Sex Offenders Act has a similar purpose, although the 
objective is achieved through provisions permitting the monitoring of 
previous offenders by Police.240 Such provisions are not included within the 
New Zealand Bill. 
(c) Contribute to public safety 
The driving force behind sex offender legislation is increasing public 
safety. The concept of a register works on the premise that, "if endangered 
citizens know that a released ... offender is among them ... they can take steps 
to prevent the victimisation of themselves and other more vulnerable 
people". 241 While the Bill is not designed to make the public aware of every 
offender living within their community, it nonetheless allows information to 
be distributed by the Police or anyone with the Minister's permission that 
has desire to increase public safety. 242 While the current Police Criminal 
Profiling Guidelines only provide for disclosure m "exceptional 
circumstances",243 it seems the Bill is designed to widen this approach, and 
allow for disclosure in a variety of situations. Although, no indication is 
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237 Sex Offender Regist,y Bill 2003 , above n 67, 4. 
238 Home Office Police Research Group, above n 10, 22. 
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given as to what these circumstances are beyond the fact they must be in 
line with the purposes of the Act. 
111 Degree of limitation justified by a legitimate public interest 
Despite the public outcry that offenders' rights must give way to 
societal interests, this in fact can only occur within the constraints of a 
legitimate public concern defence. It is universally accepted that a certain 
degree of an individual's right to privacy must be forfeited in the interests of 
the enforcement of the law and public safety. 244 However, it is also 
generally accepted that there are times where disclosure of personal 
information will not be justified by such a purpose.245 New Zealand case 
law highlights the difficultly in establishing a legitimate public concern 
defence for a register that promotes nationwide disclosure of information. 
This is largely because a primary factor in obtaining the defence lies in 
whether the people receiving the information have a right to be informed.246 
Arguably, residents in Bluff do not need to know the details of a sex 
offender living in Northland, despite the fact the information may be of 
general interest to them. 
However, the American courts have ruled that full public access to a 
register does not amount to a wider distribution of the information than is 
necessary. It is suggested that the public will only access information about 
offenders within their own community and communities they intend to 
travel to.247 Therefore, in reality, the information is only disclosed to those 
who the offender poses a risk to. On this basis, Paul v Verniero held that, 
any disclosure will be legitimate as "the privacy interest is substantially 
outweighed by the state's compelling interest in disclosure".248 However, 
this approach would not be condoned by either the New Zealand or the 
United Kingdom courts who have stated that widespread disclosure will 
244 Nigel Waters, above n 159, 3. 
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rarely be justified.249 For example, Brown makes it clear that, "any 
legitimate public interest in a convicted and recently paroled paedophile 
living in the community can be met without releasing extensive information 
to a wide audience".250 
Nonetheless, the United Kingdom case of Hellewell states that the 
disclosure of offenders' information in a controlled manner is capable of 
attracting the public concern defence. 25 1 Laws J notes that if the information 
is distributed only to those who have a "reasonable need to make use of it" 
for the prevention of crime, then any breach of the offender's right to 
privacy is minimised. 252 Provided the Bill tightly regulates disclosure to 
those who legitimately require the information, the breach of privacy is 
justified. Therefore, in order to obtain a public concern defence any register 
must be accessible solely by the Police, and the information must not be 
distributed on a widespread or indiscriminate scale. Disclosure must be 
subject to strict guidelines as to how and when this information can 
legitimately be released, keeping in mind both the rights of offenders and 
needs of the public. However, the Bill does not propose a limitation that 
fulfils this requirement and as such, in its current form, would not attract a 
defence of legitimate public concern to breaches of offenders' privacy 
rights. 
I V Proportionality 
The final consideration 111 determining the legitimacy of a rights 
based restriction is an inquiry as to whether the restriction is a proportional 
response to the harm that is sought to be prevented. This consideration 
embodies the notion that you should not use a sledge hammer to crack a 
nut.
253 
In completing this inquiry it is important to consider the effectiveness 
of the Bill at achieving its objectives, whether the limitation is excessively 
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restrictive, and ultimately whether there are other viable alternatives that 
would infringe upon offenders rights to a lesser degree. 
(a) Effectiveness of the Bill 
Commentators Butler and Butler suggest that the effectiveness of the 
legislation 1s a pnmary concern within any discussion into 
proportionality. 254 This is particularly the case, given that the Justice and 
Electoral Committee ultimately declined the Bill on the basis of reports 
from the New Zealand Police and Ministry of Justice, which indicated the 
register, was unlikely to achieve its objectives. 255 
(i) Assist police in their investigations 
Submissions made by the New Zealand Police on the Bill outlined 
the current internal intelligence systems maintained by the Police. Presently, 
the Wanganui database routinely collects the type of information a register 
would contain, and in fact, contains a more detailed criminal history of 
offenders than the Bill proposes. The database includes released offenders' 
residential addresses, provided by the Probation Service under section 54 of 
the Parole Act. 256 A similar database, connected with an information 
sharing scheme, is also currently being established in Dunedin. Information 
for this database is being contributed by the Police, Department of 
Corrections, Child Youth and Family Services, Housing New Zealand and 
Work and Income. 25 7 Thus, any register established under the Bill will 
merely be replicating information already available to the Police under 
current practices and guidelines. 25 8 While it is acknowledged that the current 
databases do not always contain up-to-date residential address details, the 
costs of establishing and maintaining a register solely to obtain these details 
. . l 259 1s not a propo1t1ona response. 
254 Butler and Butler, above n 98, 145. 
255 Justice and Electoral Committee, above n 3, 1. 
256 New Zealand Prisoners Aid and Rehabilitation Society, above n 60, 6. 
257 Howard League Society for Penal Reform Sex Offender Regist1y Bill 2003 (Submission 
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This lack of effectiveness 1s exacerbated by the fact that 
international research suggests offender compliance rates, in terms of 
registering correct and up-to-date residential address details, are particularly 
low. For example, a study completed by Presser and Gunnison in 1999 
found that 75% of offenders in California failed to register their address 
upon being released from prison or upon moving from their registered 
address. 260 Similarly, some American states have reported that up to 80-
90% of the addresses on their register are inaccurate or missing 
information. 261 Ironically, research also suggests that those offenders, who 
do choose to register, are generally more stable and pose less of a threat to 
the community, than those who do not register.262 Thus, it seems many 
offenders will be reluctant to comply with the registration requirements and 
those who do, will largely not pose a risk to the community. 
In a similar vein, international experience suggests that Police are 
unlikely to consider the registers accuracy and completeness a high 
priority.263 Therefore, the register will rarely be an accurate picture of 
offenders' whereabouts. As a result of this, United Kingdom research states 
that "register intelligence" is only used in 23% of investigations,264 and is 
primarily confined to risk assessment inquiries.265 It is on this basis that 
many submissions stated that establishing a register will not actually aid 
Police in their duties and will in fact waste a considerable amount of time, 
effort and resources that could have been put into front line policing. 266 
(ii) Reduce sexual offending 
While it can logically be argued that a register may help police 
identify and eliminate suspects quicker, there is no empirical evidence to 
260 
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suggest a register will reduce sexual offending. This is primarily because 
registers do nothing to contribute to the management of offenders in the 
community or aid in their rehabilitation. 267 Those in favour of sex offender 
registries have always argued that public notification actually deters sex 
offenders from re-offending, and therefore prevents tragedies from 
occurnng. Proponents of these registries, however, offer comparatively 
strong criticism of the effectiveness of registers based on their unintended 
effects on an offenders' rehabilitation. It thus follows, that it is necessary to 
consider whether rehabilitating offenders or notifying the community of 
their whereabouts is a more important objective. 
For years, a debate has raged regarding labelling theory and the 
merits of publicly 'naming and shaming' offenders. Some research suggests 
that the shame involved in co1mnunity notification is sufficient to deter an 
offender from future offending. It is this premise that is used to justify the 
publication of recidivist drink driving convictions in local newspapers. 
However, there is also a considerable amount of literature outlining the 
harmful effects of such shaming. This is particularly pertinent given the 
considerable stigma attached to sexual offending. 
Re-integrating an offender into the community is one of the most 
important steps in treating and rehabilitating sexual offenders. 268 This 
process involves offenders obtaining accommodation, employment, support 
services, rebuilding connections with family and friends, and establishing a 
place for themselves within the community. Public notification schemes 
hinder this process by socially isolating offenders and creating very real 
safety concerns.269 Ultimately, such disclosure can result in offenders: 270 
breaking off contact with probation officers, moving from addresses that 
were monitored by police, altering their appearance, failing to attend 
267 Sex Offender Registry Bill, above n 67, 4. 
268 BBC News Sarah's Law: Can it work? (21 December 200 I) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/ 1704533.stm (last accessed 18 September 2007). 
269 New Zealand Prisoners Aid and Rehabilitation Society, above n 60, 8. 
270 The Telegraph Pressure to halt name and shame campaign (19 August 2001) 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2000/07/31 /npaed3 l .xml (last accessed 
18 September 2007). 
49 
treatment programmes and adopting habits that signal a return to 
offending, directly as a result of the ' outing ' ofoffenders. 
Psychologists suggest that the secrecy and isolation created by notification 
actually allows paedophilia and other sexual deviancies to thrive as 
offenders are no longer forced to answer to the expectations of their 
families, friends or support groups.27 1 A study completed in the United 
States, for example, notes that offenders who were subject to community 
notification schemes were re-convicted twice as quickly as those that were 
not. 272 In this respect, it is also impo1tant to remember that when an offender 
is forced out of one community, they move into another that is then unaware 
of their offending and ill equipped to provide treatment, placing the public 
at a greater risk. 
As the Bill does not provide provisions for Police monitoring of 
previous offenders,273 any objective in reducing offending relies solely on 
the deterrent effect of those surrounding the offender knowing of their 
· · 2N h previous conv1ct1ons. However, t e Canterbury Council for Civil 
Liberties states that community notification does not in fact reduce 
offending. They suggest that a stable job and marital arrangements are the 
most important deterrent for sexual offenders. 275 Thus, by publicising these 
details it is actually increases the likelihood that offenders will re-offend, 
due to the subsequent effect on their relationships and employment 
positions, coupled with the other negative effects on their rehabilitation.276 
Similarly, research into labelling theory also states that community 
notification can propel individuals' further towards offending. The John 
Howard Society notes that "a percentage of offenders will re-offend because 
of the stress and pressure imposed by a hostile, rejectionist community that 
has branded the offender as a pariah". 277 
27 1John Howard Society of Alberta , above n 8, 9. 
272 Ibid. 
273 
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Finally, it is also important to consider the consequential vigilantism 
that is sure to follow from community notification schemes. Whilst the Bill 
is ambiguous as to the degree of public access permitted to the register, 
there is nonetheless a significant risk that anyone who accesses it will make 
improper use of the information. Such abuse can result in threats, 
harassment and violence against offenders, but also against those mistaken 
for offenders. 278 For example, in the United Kingdom, a female 
paediatrician suffered vigilante attacks after she was mistaken for a 
paedophile. 279 Similarly, there is always the risk of Police abusing the 
register through the continued harassment of local sexual offenders 
whenever an offence occurs within their community. 280 While it is 
acknowledged that the Police must be able to warn the public of serious 
immediate threats to their safety, such warnings must be directed 
specifically to those in need. Research completed in America notes that 
targeted warnings are considerably more effective for citizens than a list of 
1 OOO people who live in their vicinity, and may or may not pose a risk to 
them.28 1 
(iii) Contribute to Public Safety 
Whether the establishment of a register will actually offer the public 
increased protection is a divisive subject, and one that lacks conclusive 
research, as no register in the world has been operating long enough to make 
definite conclusions.282 Community notification legislation been labelled by 
some as a "misguided response to violent crime", given its unintended 
consequences. Fundamentally, publicly accessible registers actually 
decrease public safety and merely serve to create a false sense of security.283 
The Howard League Society for Penal Reform states that while the Bill is a 
278 Ibid , 8. 
279 BBC World News Paediatrician attacks ignorant vandals (30 August 2000) 
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well intentioned response to the publics fear, it ultimately is nothing more 
than "a blunt instrument in terms of its promotion of public safety".
284 The 
League notes that the Bill fails to take account of:2 85 
the actual level ofrisk posed by convicted sexual offenders; our current 
inability to accurately predict serious re-offending; actual conviction 
rates; the nature of any subsequent offending, and the actions which 
might more effectively be pursued ifwe are to reduce offending. 
Similarly, it would seem little credence has been given to the fact that the 
bulk of offenders are already known to their victims, sexual offending 
recidivism rates are low, and any register established will be incomplete. 
Hence, there is no rational connection between the objectives of the Bill and 
the limit it seeks to place on offenders' rights. 
A primary reason why registers are largely redundant is that the bulk 
of sexual offences actually occur within the family. Hence, most offenders 
are already known to potential victims286 . While the media has created a 
notion of 'stranger danger ' , in fact only 5-20% of offences are committed by 
a person who is a stranger to the victim. 287 In the majority of cases, victims 
receive no additional protection by having the offenders details published in 
a register. Commentators also allude to the fact that a register may have the 
unintended consequence of forcing victims not to report such offending 
given their family member will be "marked for life" by the register.288 It is 
for these reasons that Greg O'Connor, President of the New Zealand Police 
Association, suggests that "more rigorous DNA sampling would be a more 
productive way to eliminate and identify a suspect".289 
Interestingly, due to the sensationalisation of sexual crimes by the 
media, polls have indicated that the public perceive the recidivism rate for 
sexual offending to lie at 70-80%.290 In reality this figure is approximately 
284 Howard League Society for Penal Reform, above n 257, I. 
285 Ibid. 
286 Sarah's laiv: Can it work?, above n 268. 
287 
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10-20%, depending on whether the offender has received treatment.291 
Research conducted by the Ministry of Justice concluded that: 292 
Only a very small proportion of all released prisoners are reconvicted 
of very serious offences, and the type and seriousness of the offence 
that a person was imprisoned for is not a reliable predictor of the 
likelihood that they will commit a serious offence in the future . 
In an analysis of the Kia Marama Sex Offender Treatment Programme 
established in New Zealand in 1989, researchers concluded that sexual 
offenders who did not receive treatment re-offended at a rate of 23%, and 
those that did receive treatment were only reconvicted in 10% of cases.293 
Also, for those offenders that were reconvicted the most common conviction 
was for traffic offending. 294 Ultimately, the reconviction rate for sex 
offenders committing another sexual offence is actually remarkably low.295 
For example, studies completed in the United Kingdom suggested that only 
7% of people convicted for sexual offences had a previously been convicted 
of sexual offending.296 
In a similar vem, it 1s important to note that any register will 
obviously be incomplete and thus ineffective, given the bulk of offenders 
will not be included within its confmes. Obviously, sexual offenders who 
are not caught, or those individuals that are first time offenders will be 
absent from the register.297 Similarly, offenders who have received name 
suppression, so as to not identify their victims, will also not be included298 . 
Studies carried out in Massachusetts found that, out of the 136 serious 
sexual offences that occurred in 1998, only 27% of the offenders would 
have been included on the register. 299 This problem is compounded by the 
fact that there is an extremely high dark figure of crime for sexual offences 
29 1 Brendan Anstiss The effectiveness of correctional treatment (Prepared for the 
Department of Corrections, Wellington, 27 August 2007). 
292 Philip Spier Reconviction and re-imprisonment rates for released pri oners (Prepared 
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due to the intimate and often embarrassing nature of the crime.
300 As a result 
many offences are not reported or recorded. Additionally, there is an 
extremely low conviction rates for sexual offences. For example, in Sydney 
there were 183 child sexual assault cases in 2002, and only 32 resulted in a 
conviction. 301 However, most importantly the New Zealand Bill is non 
retroactive and thus any offenders sentenced prior to the Bill's introduction 
will not be included. Practically, both for Police investigations and public 
safety, this is a serious limitation to any register given the numerous 
offenders that will be absent from the list. Furthermore, a considerable 
period of time will need to pass before a comprehensive register can be 
collaborated. 302 
(b) Alternatives 
The inquiry into whether there are viable alternatives to limiting a 
right has "been described as both crucial and difficult".
303 Case law suggests 
it is necessary for the restriction to be "as little inference as possible"
304 and 
''the least ambitious means to protect vulnerable groups".
305 Therefore, it is 
important to determine whether there are alternative measures available to 
achieve the Bill's objectives. R v Oakes states that, ''when assessing the 
alternative means which are available to Parliament, it is important to 
consider whether less intrusive means would achieve the same objective or 
would achieve the same objective as effectively".
306 McLachlin J in RJR-
MacDonald Inc also notes that, the only time a restriction will fail is when 
"the government fails to explain why a significantly less intrusive and 
equally effective measure was not chosen".
307 
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(i) Is the Bill proposing an excessive restriction on the right to privacy? 
In order to detennine whether a restriction is excess, one must first 
consider how wide the restriction would need to be to achieve its objectives. 
As discussed earlier in the paper, the establishment of a publicly accessible 
register will never reduce sexual offending or contribute to public safety 
given its negative effects on offenders' rehabilitation. Therefore, even if 
offenders' privacy rights are greatly restricted, and complete public access 
to the register is permitted, these objectives would not be achieved. It thus 
follows, that the Bill is imposing an extremely excessive restriction on 
offenders' rights in order to achieve a purpose that is unattainable. 
In respect of the Bill's other purpose of aiding the police in their 
investigations, the Howard League for Penal Reform suggests the Bill 
"overstates and over-responds to the problem". 308 It is acknowledged in 
Police submissions that increased DNA sampling powers would better 
achieve the objective. Nonetheless, there is a valid argument that an up-to-
date register of offenders' residential addresses would contribute to 
decreasing Po lice investigation times to some degree. However, in order to 
achieve this purpose the New Zealand Law Society submits that:309 
the simplest and most direct means of achieving thi s, and at the same 
time providing proper safeguards against misuse of the information on 
the register, may be simply to direct the Police to maintain a register, 
rather than a Minister of the Crown , and to provide that no person sha ll 
have access to the register other than Police officers for the purposes of 
investigating sex offences. 
Such an approach is appropriate. Particularly, given the Bill's other 
objectives can not be achieved by public access to the register, and may in 
fact be fmihered by a confidential register. As Parliament provides no 
explanation as to why a register, such as the one proposed by the New 
Zealand Law Society, could not be implemented, the case of RJR-
MacDonald Inc states the restriction on privacy must fail. 310 
308 Howard League Society for Penal Reform, above 11 257, 1. 
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(ii) Are there less restrictive alternatives than a register? 
This paper acknowledges the extreme impo1iance of reducing sexual 
offending and ensuring public safety. Therefore, rather than pursuing a 
register that would be largely ineffective at achieving this goal, and may in 
fact decrease such safety, it is suggested that community based alternatives 
designed to reduce sexual offending should be pursued. 311 Instead of 
focusing on reactive policing and how best to aid police investigations, 
emphasis must be placed upon rehabilitating and reintegrating offenders 
back into the community successfully. 312 The John Howard Society outlines 
the following available alternatives to establishing sex offender registers: 313 
1. Specialised, professionally operated and adequately funded 
treatment services in correctional facilities. Such services 
should not only treat the offender while in prison but also 
assist in the development of a plan for relapse prevention and 
provide the link for release into community based services to 
facilitate the maintenance for the plan. 
2. A system that makes gradual release part of every sentence. 
3. The focussing of community supervision and treatment 
resources on those with the greatest need and who pose the 
greatest risk. 
4. An end to those policies and practices that undermine the 
gradual release process such as the practice of detention under 
federal legislation and reducing the granting of provincial 
parole and temporary absences. 
5. Available community based treatment and residential services 
that are specialised, professionally operated and adequately 
funded. Such services should be accessible to all offenders 
both before and after their sentences. 
While New Zealand has already begun to implement such policies, 
we are far from providing a comprehensive package for controlling, 
managing and rehabilitating offenders. 314 The New Zealand Prisoners Aid 
and Rehabilitation Society suggest New Zealand lacks an inter-agency 
rehabilitation focus , and needs to recognise that "managing sex offenders 
involves more than criminal matters". They suggest that agencies such as 
social services, housing, education, and youth offending organisations must 
all be involved in collaborative treatment programmes. 31 5 Ultimately, the 
government simply needs to focus, not on notifying the public where these 
3 11 John Howard Society of Alberta, above n 8, 13 . 
3 12 Howard League Society for Penal Reform , above n 257, 4. 
313 John Howard Society of Alberta , above n 8, 13 . 
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offenders reside, but on re-building offenders lives, so they are capable of 
living a fulfilling, offending free existence. 
V What limitation on privacy can be demonstrably justified? 
South African case State v Mamamela is authority for the 
proposition that "the more serious the impact of the measure or the right, the 
more persuasive or compelling the justification must be". 316 The 
rationalisation for sex offender registries must therefore be particularly 
convincing given its substantial effects on offenders rights. However, the 
justification offered in the explanatory note of the Bill is far from 
compelling. The Bill's restrictions fail to achieve two of its objectives, and 
only somewhat contribute to the third. It is clear that restricting offenders' 
privacy rights to the degree suggested in the Bill is by no means a 
proportional response to somewhat decreasing police investigation times. 
As outlined in part two of this paper, the courts have given little 
guidance as to when something is demonstrably justified. However, the 
phrase seems to embody the notion that, in a free and democratic society it 
is necessary to ensure legislation protects human dignity and promotes 
equality. 31 7 In this case, any form of public access to a register containing 
the residential address details of a sexual offender, puts that offender's 
safety at risk. Whilst it is acknowledged that recidivist offenders pose a 
threat to society, our ability to predict which offenders will re-offend is 
limited . Therefore, in a free and democratic society, considering the factors 
discussed through out this paper, an offender's right to privacy can only be 
justifiably limited by a register established, maintained and accessed solely 
by the Police, for the purposes of police investigations. 
In order for the Bill to be considered constitutional many clauses 
will need to be amended, as they are either ambiguous or silent in certain 
respects. 3 18 Fundamentally, it unclear who is permitted to access the register 
316 State v Mamame/a , above n 146, para 32. 
317 R v Oakes, above n 129, 136 (SCC). 
318 Ministry of Justice, above n 9, 5. 
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and what use can be made of the information. Clause 13 must be re-drafted 
in order to ensure only sworn Police officers can obtain access to the 
register. Similarly, specific guidelines as to the information's use must be 
incorporated into the provision. It is suggested that the Police be permitted 
to use the register in order to aid them in locating and interviewing previous 
offenders. Necessarily, such a purpose would include disclosing details 
contained on the register to members of the public that are deemed in need 
of the information. Consideration will need to be given as to whether the 
cunent Police Criminal Profiling Guidelines provide a suitable foundation 
for determining when such disclosure is permitted. The New Zealand Law 
Society also suggests, that provisions as to the consequences of unlawful 
disclosure should also be implemented, so as to prevent abuse of police 
access to the register and inappropriate disclosure. 
319 
Ultimately, the Bill as it stands is an ineffective, disproportional 
response to a moral panic. Munay Edridge of Barnardos notes, that 
establishing a register of this nature is nothing more than "an ambulance at 
the bottom of a cliff',
320 when what is needed is a focus on reducing and 
preventing offending in the first place. While it is understandable that the 
government wishes to decrease this abhorrent form of offending, its 
response must be considered, effective and most importantly, just. 
VII CONCLUSION 
It remains important for the government and the courts to remember 
that "no matter how repulsed society is by sexual crimes, we cannot place 
offenders in a unique, separate class bereft of constitutional rights".
32 1 
While it is tempting to suggest that the community's rights must outweigh 
offenders, it necessary for legislators to refrain from projecting their animus 
3 19 New Zealand Law Society, above n 56, 4 . 
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against the offending into laws that violate offender's fundamental rights. 
Whilst Deborah Coddington's goal of preventing merely one person from 
being the subject of sexual abuse is admirable, it is unrealistic in a 
legislative sense. The restrictions in the Bill would substantially affect 
offenders' lives, while also decreasing public safety. 
The Justice and Electoral Committee were correct in their decision 
to strike down the Bill. However, this decision was justified under the 
wrong premise. The effectiveness of such a register is fundamental. 
However, the constitutionality of legislation is more important. Discussion 
as to the effectiveness of such legislation is essential and may change the 
results of a proportionality inquiry. Yet, ultimately effectiveness is only one 
factor to consider within the framework of a section 5 analysis. It seems that 
in its haste to respond to growing public concern over sexual offending, the 
government made the same mistake as American legislators and failed to 
give proper consideration to the Bill's legal grounding. While they 
successfully appeared to address the publics fear, their approach was futile. 
The Bill should not have reached the Select Committee process given that, 
from its conception, it was never going to be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society. 
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